NFAC #3926-81

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National I	ntelliaence	Officers
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SP - 146/81 24 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Representatives of the National Foreign Intelligence Board
FROM:	Acting National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
SUBJECT:	IIM: "Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense"
National Securit	e to a requirement from the Assistant to the President for ty Affairs (see Attachment 1), we plan to produce an IIM doctrine, policies, programs and prospects for ballistic . Attachment 2 contains a draft concept, TOR, and production

schedule for this IIM. There will be a meeting to discuss and coordinate this material on Tuesday, 7 July, 1000-1500, in Room 6B02, CIA Headquarters.

Attachments

Please advise

attend this meeting.

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of the names of those who will



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ATTACHMENT 1

## THE WHITE HOUSE

3155

Executive Registry

WASHINGTON

NFAC 3608-81

SECRET

June 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

The Soviet ABM Program

In the course of recent interdepartmental meetings on SALT, it has become clear that serious uncertainties and differences of view exist both within the Intelligence Community and elsewhere in the Administration over the purpose and scope of Soviet research and development efforts in the ABM area. These uncertainties and differences have an important bearing on Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and associated agreements, particularly the Agreed Statement on concurrent testing of ABM and air defense components of November, 1978. Some consider the analysis of the Intelligence Community to be inadequate.

Soviet ABM efforts are of critical concern to us because of the potentially severe consequences of a potential Soviet denunciation of the ABM Treaty and "breakout" from its limitations.

In view of the need to begin immediately to review the U.S. position on ABM both in the context of our own strategic programs and in connection with ongoing interagency consideration of SALT issues (including the ABM Treaty review due in 1982), it would be most helpful if you could take initiatives to create a high-level interagency review and assessment of the Soviet ABM effort. This review should involve a fresh examination of assumptions utilized within the Community in studying ABMrelated issues, and should provide a thorough airing of interagency differences. It should give full weight to open source as well as classified material, and should consider in depth the question of Soviet strategic doctrine as it pertains to Soviet activities in the ABM area.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SECRET

Review June 8, 1987

The Vice President SECRI cc:

